Application of the Brussels I Regulation by Hungarian Courts

Studiu^[1] publicat în volumul In Honorem Flavius Antoniu Baias. Aparența în drept, tomul III, Ed. Hamangiu, 2021, p. 420-438.

Introduction

One of the leading considerations behind the CEPIL project was that the value of private international law (PIL) unification can be preserved only if EU private international law (EU PIL) instruments are applied correctly and uniformly, hence, the European endeavours in the field should not and cannot stop at statutory unification but need to embrace the judicial practice and make sure that besides the vertical communication between the CJEU and national courts, there is also a horizontal communication between national courts, authorities and the legal community in general. The purpose of this publication is to contribute to this horizontal communication between Member State courts by providing an analytical insight into the Hungarian case-law on the Brussels I Regulation^[2].

EU PIL instruments, including the Brussels I Regulation, are regularly applied by the Hungarian judiciary. The survey carried out as part of the CEPIL produced 129 cases where the Brussels I Regulation was applied. In 81% of the cases (104 matters), no substantive issues of interpretation emerged, which suggests that Hungarian courts apply the Brussels I Regulation smoothly and no substantial conceptual issues arise. Hungarian courts have also been fairly active in terms of referring PIL cases to the C.J.E.U.^[3], three of these concerned the Brussels I Regulation: in Hochtief, in Flight Refund v. Deutsche Lufthansa and in GVH v. Siemens.

It is noteworthy that EU PIL had an impact also on the handling of matters falling outside the scope of EU conflicts rules in many ways. On the one hand, national conflicts rules governing matters outside the scope of the EU regulations, though not identical, were significantly influenced by EU PIL^[4]. On the other hand, mutual trust was enhanced by the emergence of EU PIL, which facilitated recognition and enforcement also in matters not covered by EU legislation. For instance, while, under Hungarian law, recognition and enforcement presupposes reciprocity, in Case Pf.20218/2013/8^[5], the High Court of Appeals of Debrecen disregarded this requirement when it had to decide on the recognition of the judgment of another Member State in a subject not covered by any EU PIL instrument at the relevant time (matrimonial property)^[6]. Absent an international treaty providing otherwise, foreign judgments in pecuniary matters can be recognized and enforced in Hungary only if there is reciprocity^[7]. However, the court seems to have disregarded this requirement as to a judgment of a sister-state, stressing that due to the principle of mutual trust the recognition court may, in principle, not review the jurisdiction of the court rendering the judgment and recognition may be rejected only exceptionally.

This article, first, by way of background, provides a concise overview of the fundamental features of Hungarian PIL, the status of case-law and the structure of the judicial system. This is followed by the presentation of the case-law along conceptual issues.

§1. Fundamental features of Hungarian law and case-law

The Hungarian legal system belongs to the civil-law family. Hungarian private law has Roman law roots with a mix of traditional customary law elements, and statutory law plays a central role. The application and interpretation of the law is mainly based on the construction of the statute or other regulation, however, case-law plays a central role in this process. PIL is regulated by Act XXVIII of 2017 on Private International Law (2017 APIL or APIL)^[8]. This replaced Law-Decree (Act) 13 of 1979 on private international law (1979 APIL). Both the 1979 and 2017 APIL, as the code of Hungarian PIL, contain the Hungarian choice-of-law rules and provision on international procedural law, including jurisdiction, recognition and enforcement and judicial cooperation. Hungary is also party to 18 international multilateral treaties with PIL content, four of which are in force through Hungary’s EU membership, and has about 30 bilateral international treaties with other countries on legal assistance in judicial matters covering also civil cases. These treaties regulate various PIL matters^[9].

Case-law plays a central role in the application of the law, including PIL. Court judgments are published after having been anonymized and are freely available at the courts’ website (www.birosag.hu). However, court orders are not published and are publicly accessible only if they are selected by one of the court reports (collections) and published by them.

There are different court reports (collections), which publish judicial decisions concerning matters of principle. One of these is “Judicial Decisions” (in Hungarian: “Bírósági Határozatok”). Cases reported here receive the collections special numbering, which starts with “BH.”.

There is a special mechanism in Hungarian law that is meant to ensure the consistency of the judicial practice; this is the “procedure for the consistency of the case-law” (in Hungarian: “jogegységi eljárás”), at the end of which a “decision for the consistency of the case law” (in Hungarian: “jogegységi határozat”) is rendered. The Supreme Court of Hungary (hereafter: Supreme Court) is obliged to ensure the consistency of the case-law, and “decisions for the consistency of the case-law” are binding on the courts. It is very important that these decisions are not judgments in the sense that they do not adjudicate a particular matter; on the other hand, they simply decide questions of interpretation of the law.

The Hungarian judicial system is four-tiered, comprising of the local courts, regional courts, high courts of appeal and the Supreme Court. The general courts (first instance courts) are the local courts (in Budapest: district courts) and the regional courts, in Budapest the Budapest-Capital Regional Court (in Hungarian: “Fővárosi Törvényszék”). There are five high courts of appeal seated in Győr, Budapest, Debrecen, Szeged and Pécs.

Regional courts are general (first instance) courts, which handle all disputes with the exception of the ones that come under the general competence of local courts. Regional courts also act as labour courts. Local courts handle low value claims, with the exception of certain matters which come under the original (subject-matter) competence of regional courts irrespective of the claim’s value (e.g. copyright, international carriage of goods), actions concerning the personal status and enforcement disputes^[10]. Cross-border matters may come under the competence of both local and regional courts. Company registrars are run by the company court, which is part of the regional court. In Hungary, there are no special courts. Regional courts act both as general courts and appellate courts: they hear the disputes not coming under the competence of the local courts and the appeals against the judgments of the latter. High courts of appeal are high appellate courts adjudicating the appeals against the judgments of the county courts. Parties have one appeal of right: local court judgments can be appealed to regional courts, while regional court judgments can be appealed to the courts of appeal. The judicial system is headed by the Supreme Court, which hears extraordinary appeals on points of law. This is the procedure of supervision (in Hungarian: “felülvizsgálati eljárás”), initiated through a plea of supervision (in Hungarian: “felülvizsgálati kérelem”).

§2. Scope of application: civil and commercial matters and relation with other instruments

In Case Gfv.IX.30.186/2010^[11], the Supreme Court applied the Brussels I Regulation to an administrative authority’s termination of a sponsorship contract (which it was a party to), as the authority did not act in its capacity as a public authority.

In Case Kf.37137/2019/6^[12], the Supreme Court applied the C.J.E.U.’s ruling in C-102/15 Gazdasági Versenyhivatal v. Siemens Aktiengesellschaft Österreich. According to the Hungarian Competition Act (HCA)^[13], the appeal to the court does not suspend the obligation to pay the competition fine, but if the court quashes the fine, it has to be repaid with interest. In this case, the Hungarian Competition Office (HCO) refunded a fine with interest, because its decision was quashed. Nonetheless, the HCO submitted an extraordinary appeal to the Supreme Court, which overturned the judgment of the lower court and reinstated the HCO’s decision. As a consequence, the defendant paid the fine again, however, refused to refund the interest it earlier received from the HCO, as the HCA contained no provision on that. Given the regulatory gap in the HCA, the HCO sued the defendant before the civil court with reference to the Civil Code’s rules on unjust enrichment and claimed that Hungarian courts have jurisdiction under the Brussels I Regulation. Nonetheless, the C.J.E.U. held that “an action for recovery of sums not due on the ground of unjust enrichment (…) which has its origin in the repayment of a fine imposed in competition law proceedings does not fall within ‘civil and commercial matters’” in the application of the Brussels I Regulation.

Case Kf.37137/2019/6 centered around the same issue and the Supreme Court established that the demand to refund the interest paid is an administrative matter and not a “civil or commercial matter”, hence, the Brussels I Regulation did not apply^[14].

This proposition was confirmed by the Supreme Court also in Case Kf.37339/2019/8^[15].

In Case Gpkf.IV.40.160/2014/2^[16], the High Court of Appeal of Pécs, on the basis of Article 71 of the Brussels I Regulation, applied the jurisdictional rules of Article 31(1) of the CMR instead of those of the Regulation. The same approach was followed by the High Court of Appeal of Budapest in Case Gf.40035/2014/7^[17].

§3. Special jurisdiction for contractual and delictual matters

The establishment of jurisdiction involves a vicious circle. The circumstance included in the rules of jurisdiction (the jurisdictional ground) can be established only after looking into the merits of the case, while the court can look into the merits only if it has jurisdiction. Hence, at this stage, courts inquire if the plaintiff’s claim, based on the circumstances alleged by him, comes under one of the heads of jurisdiction. Here, the court does not examine if the plaintiff’s allegations are actually true but carries out a hypothetical analysis: can jurisdiction be established if assuming that the plaintiff’s allegations are true? Accordingly, the relevant question is if the plaintiff’s allegations satisfy the conditions of the given head of jurisdiction. If the court went beyond the allegations stated in the plaintiff’s statement of claim, it would engage in a premature substantive analysis.

In Case Pfv.I.20.164/2019^[18], the Supreme Court held that Article 7(1) of the Brussels I Regulation applies and establishes jurisdiction if, after looking into the parties’ statements, the court has no well-grounded suspicion about the existence of a contractual relationship. In other words, when deciding on jurisdiction, the court has to proceed from the statements of the parties. Everything that is beyond that and raises questions concerning the existence and validity of the contract goes beyond the application of the rules of jurisdiction and is part of the substantive analysis.

In Case Gfv.IX.30.187/2011^[19], the Supreme Court interpreted Articles 7(1) and 7(2) of the Brussels I Regulation in the context of pre-contracts. The court established that as the contract to be executed on the basis of the pre-contract was to be concluded in Hungary (“the place of performance of the contract would have been determined in Hungary”), Hungarian courts had jurisdiction under Article 7(1). That is, in case of pre-contracts, the place of the conclusion of the contract the pre-contract targets is to be regarded as the place of performance under Article 7(1). The court also referred to Article 7(2) of the Brussels I Regulation. In this regard, the damages were defined partially as expenses and partially as loss of profit. The court noted that the loss of profit occurred in Hungary, as did a part of the expenses, hence, the damages also established the jurisdiction of Hungarian courts.

In Case 16.Gf.40.303/2009/5^[20], the High Court of Appeal of Budapest encountered a difficult question of characterization concerning Articles 7(1) and 7(2) of the Brussels I Regulation. According to the then-effective rules of company law, the person who acquired controlling influence over a company had to report this to the company registrar. The failure to report entailed the controlling shareholder’s subsidiary liability^[21]. This raised a question of characterization: is this subsidiary liability contractual or non-contractual? The controlling shareholder’s liability was not fault-based, which suggested that it did not rest on a delictual basis. The High Court of Appeal of Budapest held that the subsidiary liability attached to the failure to report the acquisition of direct control is a form of piercing the corporate veil and does not come under the notion of delictual or quasi delictual liability, hence, it does not come under Article 7(2) but under Article 7(1) of the Brussels I Regulation. Given that the basis of the plaintiff’s claim was a loan contract and the place of performance of the contractual obligation in question was Hungary, Hungarian courts had jurisdiction.

Case Gf.20003/2015/10^[22] emerged from a contractual dispute concerning the transfer of shares in limited liability companies. The seat of one of the defendants was in the Channel Islands, hence, the Brussels I Regulation was considered inapplicable due to Article 355 TFEU^[23]. Accordingly, the court established its jurisdiction on the basis of the Hungarian rules. As to the defendant seated in Luxembourg, the court applied the Brussels I Regulation.

In this case, the parties concluded a share transfer agreement concerning limited liability companies. In Hungarian law, business shares are not negotiable instruments (contrary to shares is stock corporations). The High Court of Appeal of Győr conceived the agreement as a sales contract and defined the place where the goods were to be delivered as the country where the acquisition of the business shares was to be registered. As the transfer of the shares in a company seated in Hungary has to be registered in Hungary, the place of performance was considered to be Hungary and Hungarian courts had jurisdiction under Article 7(1) of the Brussels I Regulation.

In Case 7.G.20.255/2018/92, the plaintiff claimed compensation for cartel damages with reliance on a decision of the European Commission. The latter established that the competition law violation covered the whole European Economic Area (EEA). The Balassagyarmat Regional Court found that this implied that the harmful event occurred in Hungary, hence, Hungarian courts had jurisdiction under Article 7(2) of the Brussels I Regulation. The Court established that the plaintiff purchased the product concerned by the cartel, paid the price and traded in his used car in Hungary.

In Case 20.Gf.40.050/2020/36-II^[24], in the context of a claim for competition damages, the High Court of Appeal of Budapest, referring to the C.J.E.U.’s case-law^[25], held that the place of the harmful event was the relevant market concerned by the violation, that is, the place where the distorted prices were applied and where the victim claims to have suffered damages, even though the plaintiff sued a cartelist undertaking it has no contractual relationship with. The Court stressed that as the violation covered the whole EEA and Hungary was part of the this, the harmful event occurred in Hungary and, thus, Hungarian courts had jurisdiction^[26].

The causal reach of the harmful event as a ground of jurisdiction established in Article 7(2) of the Brussels I Regulation may raise questions of interpretation in case of indirect and consequential damages. In Case Pf.20539/2017/5^[27], the Hungarian plaintiff was on holiday in Greece and suffered serious injuries in a traffic accident. In the Greek hospital he was mistreated and was transported to Hungary for further treatment and had to undergo further operations. The wrongful treatment in the Greek hospital resulted in his permanent bodily injury, the detrimental consequences of which were sustained in Hungary. The Budapest-Capital Regional Court found that the harmful event occurred in Hungary, as the indirect and consequential damages occurred here. This was affirmed by the High Court of Appeal of Budapest.

In Case Gf.30410/2013/3^[28], the defendant wanted to set off its claim for compensation for legal costs it was awarded in a procedure in the Czech Republic against the same plaintiff concerning the same subject-matter. The Hungarian court recognized the Czech decision on legal costs. The plaintiff argued that the Hungarian court had no jurisdiction over the set-off. The High Court of Appeal of Szeged established its jurisdiction on the basis of Article 8(3) of the Brussels I Regulation. Although this provision refers to „counter-claim[s] arising from the same contract or facts on which the original claim was based” and confers jurisdiction on “the court in which the original claim is pending”, the High Court of Appeal of Szeged held that Article 8(3), as “from greater to smaller”, also covers set-off claims (argumentum a maiore ad minus). It has to be noted that the facts of the case suggest that the Czech and the Hungarian proceedings concerned the same subject-matter: the plaintiff first tried to enforce its claim in the Czech Republic, where it subsequently withdrew the claim and, then, submitted it to the Hungarian court. Hence, the Czech court terminated the procedure and awarded legal costs to the defendant.

§4. Protective rules of jurisdiction for consumers

In Case Gf.20062/2015/8^[29], the High Court of Appeal of Győr interpreted the concept of consumer contract. It held, in the context of a choice-of-court provision in the creditor’s standard terms, that a loan contract does not qualify as a consumer contract, if its purpose is to build structures on the plots owned by the debtor and its family, including an apartment complex of 18 apartments and a restaurant, which became the property of the companies.

In Case P.21044/2015/16, the Szeged Regional Court dealt with the definition of consumer contract. It held that the party’s characteristics and the purpose of the contract have to be inspected in this regard. In this case, it established that in relation to the loan contract, the plaintiff took the status of his ex-spouse because she was creditworthy due to her job and income and the purpose of the contract was clearly connected to the planned self-employment activity. Thus, the contract could not be regarded as being concluded outside the debtor’s trade or profession. This was not affected by the circumstance that the agreement fell partially outside his economic and professional activity; in such a case, the agreement does not qualify as a consumer contract.

§5. Exclusive jurisdiction under the Brussels I Regulation

In Case Gf.I.30.343/2013^[30], the High Court of Appeal of Szeged held that domain name registration is covered by Article 24(4) of the Brussels I Regulation. The Court considered that the registration of a domain name is similar to trademarks and as Article 24(4) of the Brussels I Regulation refers to “proceedings concerned with the registration or validity of patents, trademarks, designs, or other similar rights required to be deposited or registered”, Hungarian courts have exclusive jurisdiction over domain names registered in Hungary (that is, .hu).

In Case 9.Pkf.25.572/2020/2^[31], the High Court of Appeal of Budapest highlighted that the exclusive jurisdiction established by Article 24(2) of the Brussels I Regulation concerning immovable property extends solely to in rem claims (and tenancy), hence, this head of jurisdiction does not cover claims under the law of obligations. The term “rights in rem” has autonomous EU law meaning and has to be interpreted narrowly. Its key element is the erga omnes effect (while the law of obligations features the principle of privity). Accordingly, not all claims that concern in rem rights in immovable property are covered by Article 24(2) of the Regulation. The action in these cases is centered around the approval of a disposition over the immovable property by a person placed under guardianship. More specifically, the plaintiff sued for the judicial declaration of the contract’s invalidity. The Court found that this implied no in rem rights and came under the law of obligations, hence, Article 24(2) of the Regulation did not apply.

§6. Prorogation of jurisdiction

In Case Gf.VII.30.228/2013/4^[32], the parties entered into a distribution contract which, by way of reference to the supplier’s standard terms, contained a choice-of-court clause. After a dispute emerged, the parties settled this via a memorandum, which provided that the supplier would buy back the merchandize as to which the distributor had objections. The Supreme Court held that the choice-of-court agreement covering the distribution contract did not extend to the memorandum, as the latter was not simply the consequentiality of the distribution contract but created a new contractual obligation (the supplier promised to buy the products it sold before). Accordingly, the court ignored the stipulation of the jurisdiction of German courts and established that the Hungarian court had jurisdiction, as the place of performance was in Hungary.

Hungarian courts, under Hungarian conflicts rules, had had the tendency of taking a restrictive approach as to choice-of-court agreements. According to Section 62/F(1) of the then-effective Hungarian Act on Private International Law (1979 APIL)^[33], the counterpart of Article 25 of the Brussels I Regulation, “in case of pecuniary matters, the parties may stipulate that the courts of a particular state or a particular court has jurisdiction to settle their dispute or their disputes arising from a particular legal relationship.” In Case reported as BH 2004.153, the contract stipulated the exclusive jurisdiction of “the Brussels courts” (“any legal dispute connected to the contract and/or related to its interpretation, performance, termination or cancellation comes under exclusive Brussels jurisdiction or before the Brussels courts”). The Supreme Court held that this stipulation was not legally enforceable as it was not in conformity with Section 62/F(1) of the then-effective 1979 APIL, which enabled the parties to choose either the courts of a particular state or a particular court, and the choice of Brussels courts came under none of these categories. The parties were expected to choose either Belgian courts or to name a specific Belgian court.

It is hoped that Hungarian courts will not follow this approach as to the Brussels I Regulation, although the statutory language of the two instruments is similar: according to Article 25 of the Brussels I Regulation, the parties may agree “that a [specific] court or the courts of a Member State are to have jurisdiction”.

A sign of this can be observed in Case Gfv.30382/2018/8^[34]. Here, the parties stipulated the Szolnok Local Court, however, the plaintiff submitted a claim that, because of its value, came under the subject-matter competence of the Szolnok Regional Court. Hungarian law distinguished between international jurisdiction, subject matter competence and venue. The parties may agree to international jurisdiction and venue (domestic territorial jurisdiction) but have no autonomy as to subject-matter competence. High value claims come under the original (subject-matter) competence of regional courts and while the parties may choose from the courts located in various parts of the country that have subject-matter competence, the law does not allow them, for instance, to choose a local court in a matter that, due to the value involved, comes under the competence of regional courts. In this sense, the court’s power to entertain a case is to be established along three co-ordinates and party autonomy prevails in respect to international jurisdiction and venue (territorial competence) but not subject-matter competence.

In this case, the Supreme Court emphasized that the Brussels I Regulation deals solely with the question of jurisdiction (in the international sense). To establish jurisdiction, it is necessary and sufficient, if it can be established without doubt which country’s court or courts the parties chose. The parties’ agreement need not extend to the determination of a specific court that has subject-matter and territorial competence (venue), since this is an issue coming under the given Member State’s domestic law^[35]. The Supreme Court found that when the parties stipulated the Szolnok Local Court they agreed that the case should be entertained by a Hungarian court located in Szolnok. The agreement cannot be construed narrowly, as referring solely to the matters coming under the subject-matter competence of the Szolnok Local Court, with the exclusion of matters that come under the subject-matter competence of the Szolnok Regional Court. Such a narrow construction would be irreconcilable with Article 25 of the Brussels I Regulation^[36].

The Supreme Court also noted that the application of Article 25 of the Brussels I Regulation implies the requirement of specificity (that is, the court chosen by the parties should be determinable without doubt) and the parties’ agreement did meet this requirement^[37].

In Case 10.Gpkf.44.048/2020/2^[38], the High Court of Appeal of Budapest established that given that by means of prorogation of jurisdiction the parties derogate from their rights and the choice may not be equally advantageous for them, the formal requirements embedded in Article 25 of the Brussels I Regulation have to be construed rigorously and restrictively. In this case, the choice-of-court clause was part of the defendant’s standard terms, however, the framework agreement concluded by the parties did not refer to these. The Court established that the requirement of writing would be met, if the framework agreement referred to the standard terms or the parties had signed them separately. The agreement is “evidenced in writing”, as provided in Article 25(1)(a) of the Brussels I Regulation, if one of the parties sends a unilateral written confirmatory document and the other party does not object to that within a reasonable time. It does not amount to a confirmation that after the conclusion of the framework agreement, in connection to the individual orders, the defendant sent its standard terms to the plaintiff, because there was not prior agreement the sending of the standard terms could confirm.

§7. Parallel proceedings

In Case 14.Gpkf.43.405/2012/2^[39], parallel proceedings were pending in Hungary and France. These emerged from a railway accident in Hungary. They concerned different claims and partially different parties (the proceedings in France dealt with the damages to the railroad cars, while the action in Hungary with the damages to the railroad), so lis pendens could not be established. Nonetheless, the two actions did have some overlapping issues, like who was liable for the accident and responsible for the damages. The High Court of Appeal of Budapest refused to stay the proceedings. However, it did not base its decision on Article 30 of the Brussels I Regulation but on the pertinent national rules of civil procedure, which had a narrower scope. According to the latter, if there was no lis pendens, the court could stay the proceedings only if the decision in the case before it depended on a preliminary question that was subject to another, parallel procedure. The Court did not inquire if the two actions were so closely connected that it was expedient to hear and determine them together to avoid the risk of irreconcilable judgments resulting from separate proceedings.

In Case K.27480/2015/26, the Administrative and Labor Court of Nyíregyháza, in a matter involving the judicial review of an administrative decision rendered in a tax matter, established that the recognition of another Member State’s judgment under the Brussels I Regulation does not imply that the facts established in the foreign judgment bind the Hungarian court.

In Case Pfv.21258/2018/3, Supreme Court underscored, in the context of the 2001 Brussels I Regulation, that in the first stage of the procedure for a declaration of enforceability, the court may examine solely the fulfilment of the formal requirements and may not examine the legal and factual elements of the case.

In Case Pfv.XI.21.581/2008/11^[40], the judgment debtor sought the enforcement of an Austrian judgment rendered against a Hungarian defendant. The civil procedure was carried out in German language and the court refused to translate the relevant documents (calls, forms, correspondence) to Hungarian, even though the defendant expressly requested that, because he did not speak German. The Supreme Court found that the enforcement of the judgment violated Hungarian public policy, as the Austrian civil procedure was irreconcilable with the fundamental principles of Hungarian civil procedure. These fundamental principles include the rights to use one’s mother tongue. A foreign judgment that does not respect this principle cannot be enforced in Hungary. Given that the defendant could not comprehend the forms, calls and decisions of the Austrian court, the court also violated its duty to inform, which was also part of Hungarian civil procedural law and was meant to ensure equal chances.

In Case P.20071/2014/11, the Budapest Regional Court dealt with Article 45(1)(b) of the Brussels I Regulation. It established that, in the recognition and enforcement stage, the court may not inquire whether the service of the document instituting the procedure complied with the rules, thus, the debtor cannot abuse its rights and evade enforcement, if there is merely a formal error of service that did not hinder him in exercising his right of defense. If the defendant’s right of defense was impaired during the service of the document instituting the procedure, he is expected to exhaust the legal remedies available to him. If he fails to do so, the error of service does not entail the refusal of recognition. According to the Budapest Regional Court, in the recognition and enforcement stage, it is not necessary to examine whether the service complied with the rules, the mere fact that an error occurred is not susceptible of triggering the refusal of recognition. The court held that in the recognition stage it may be examined only whether the service of the document occurred “in sufficient time and in such a way” that it did not impair the defendant’s right of defense. In case of an error of service, the primary question is whether the error was grave enough to deprive the defendant of the possibility to defend himself. In this case, the court answered the question in the negative.

In Case Pfv.I.20.122/2015^[41], the Supreme Court held that Article 45(1)(b) of the Brussels I Regulation cannot be applied, if the debtor admitted that he received the payment order, which was forwarded to him by the judgment creditor’s Italian legal representative, and directed his appeal to this legal representative and not to the court, notwithstanding the information conveyed to him. According to the Supreme Court, in this case, the relevant point was that the debtor received the payment order of the court of Pisa and had 50 days to object to it but failed to do so. A formal procedural error that does not impair the right of defense is not sufficient to serve as a ground of refusal.

In Case Pfv.20128/2016/9^[42], the plaintiff sued the Hungarian court and claimed damages because he could not have a Hungarian judgment enforced in Slovakia due to the Hungarian court’s misapplication of the pertinent EU rules, including the Brussels I Regulation. In the earlier procedure, the Hungarian plaintiff claimed damages from a Slovak defendant. The Hungarian court decided for the plaintiff, however, committed serious procedural errors: it served the Hungarian statement of claim and summons on the defendant without translating them to Slovak language. The enforcement of the judgment was refused by the Slovak court with reference to these procedural errors. This deprived the judgment of the possibility of being enforced in Slovakia. The Supreme Court held that the plaintiff was entitled to claim compensation from the Hungarian court, because the court violated the law and there was a causal link between the illegal act and the damages. It also noted that the legality of the Slovak decision to refuse enforcement could not be reviewed and its legality and fairness could not be questioned.

Conclusions

The Brussels I Regulation has been applied in numerous cases and Hungarian courts seem to have tackled the problems of the application properly. Some of the matters raised questions of interpretation not fully settled in the C.J.E.U.’s jurisprudence (e.g. set-off, place of performance of pre-contracts, place of delivery in case of transfer of shares in limited liability companies) and courts have handled them plausibly.

The jurisdictional rules of Hungarian PIL were brought in line with the Lugano Convention^[43] (with a view to joining it) and, thus, as a consequence, also with the Brussels I Regulation (at that time, the 1968 Brussels Convention). The advantage of this was that Hungarian courts got acquainted with the Brussels rules long before accession. A drawback of this might be (though this is more a risk than a fact) that courts might apply the case-law developed as to Hungarian jurisdictional rules also to the Brussels I Regulation. The most important source of challenge is, however, posed by the requirement of autonomous interpretation. The concepts of the Brussels I Regulation, in principle, have to be given an autonomous EU law meaning, while lower courts, at times, have the tendency to use the concepts and notions of national law to define these terms.

Table of cases

Case Gf.IX.30.384/2009 (Supreme Court), reported as BH+ 2010.5.224;

Case Pfv.II.21.290/2007 (Supreme Court), reported as EH 2008.1700;

Case Pfv.II.22.073/2009 (Supreme Court), reported as EH 2010.1.2141 and BH+ 2013.1.33;

Case Gf.30372/2012/7 (High Court of Appeal of Debrecen), appealed from Case 8.G.20.557/2010/18 (Szolnok Regional Court);

Case G.40057/2012/118 (Debrecen Regional Court);

Case G.40685/2012/38 (Budapest-Capital Regional Court);

Case G.41053/2008/89 (Budapest-Capital Regional Court);

Case P.20648/2011/40 (Budapest-Capital Regional Court);

Case Gf.20087/2009/7 (High Court of Appeal of Győr), appealed from Case 4.G.40.070/2006/41 (Zalaegerszeg Regional Court);

Case Gf.20424/2009/2 (High Court of Appeal of Győr);

Case Pf.20112/2014/9 (High Court of Appeal of Győr), appealed from Case P.20052/2012/79 (Győr Regional Court);

Case Pf.20136/2008/8 (High Court of Appeal of Szeged), appealed from Case 2.P.22.476/2004/65 (Szeged Regional Court);

Case P.20406/2011/71 (Szeged Regional Court);

Case Pfv.21100/2012/8 (Supreme Court), appealed from Case Pf.FV/2011/6 (High Court of Appeal of Pécs), appealed from Case P.21860/2007/89 (Zalaegerszeg Regional Court);

Case Pf.21124/2014/5 (Zalaegerszeg Regional Court), appealed from Case P.20932/2013/8 (Zalaegerszeg Local Court);

Case G.20203/2012/100 (Szolnok Regional Court);

Case Pfv.I.20.759/2013 (Supreme Court), reported as BH 2014.2.47;

Case Pf.20722/2015/4 (High Court of Appeal of Budapest), appealed from Case P.20885/2013/32 (Budapest-Capital Regional Court);

Case 10.Gf.40.417/2011/12 (High Court of Appeal of Budapest), reported as ÍH 2012.82, appealed from Case G.41438/2009/52 (Budapest-Capital Regional Court);

Case P.20968/2013/75 (Pécs Regional Court);

Case Pfv.21534/2017/8 (Supreme Court), appealed from Case Gf.40523/2016/8 (High Court of Appeal of Budapest), appealed from Case G.40319/2014/95 (Budapest-Capital Regional Court);

Case Gf.30475/2017/7 (High Court of Appeal of Debrecen), appealed from Case G.40033/2017/14 (Debrecen Regional Court);

Case Pf.21238/2018/5 (High Court of Appeal of Budapest), appealed from Case P.22279/2017/26 (Budapest-Capital Regional Court);

Case Pfv.I.21.171/2015/6 (Supreme Court), reported as BH 2016.6.144, appealed from Case Pf.632052/2015/5 (Budapest-Capital Regional Court), appealed from Case P.93648/2014/10 (Pest Central District Court);

Case Pfv.V.20.366/2016/11 (Supreme Court), reported as BH 2017.5.155;

Case Pf.20030/2016/4 (High Court of Appeal of Pécs);

Case Pfv.22351/2016/9 (Supreme Court), appealed from Case Pf.20015/2016/3 (High Court of Appeal of Győr);

Case Gfv.VII.30.130/2016 (Supreme Court), reported as BH 2017.3.97;

Case Pfv.V.20.594/2017/6 (Supreme Court), reported as BH 2018.9.250, appealed from Case Pf.638807/2016/4 (Budapest-Capital Regional Court);

Case Pfv.21365/2018/6 (Supreme Court), appealed from Case Pf.21326/2017/9 (High Court of Appeal of Budapest), appealed from Case P.20187/2017/13 (Balassagyarmat Regional Court);

Case Pfv.20771/2011/12 (Supreme Court), appealed from Case Pf.21183/2010/7 (High Court of Appeal of Budapest);

Case Pfv.IV.21.511/2015/5 (Supreme Court), appealed from Case 16.Gpkf.43.770/2015/2 (High Court of Appeal of Budapest), appealed from Case 19.G.41.978/2014/23 (Budapest-Capital Regional Court);

Case Pf.1.20065/2020/10 (High Court of Appeal of Budapest), appealed from Case 35.P.24.108/2014/178 (Budapest-Capital Regional Court);

Case 16.Gpkf.43.978/2015/2 (High Court of Appeal of Budapest), appealed from Case 25.G.42.357/2012/49 (Budapest-Capital Regional Court);

Case Gfv.30222/2013/6 (Supreme Court), appealed from Case Gf.30147/2013/5 (High Court of Appeal of Szeged), appealed from Case G.40097/2012/59 (Kecskemét Regional Court);

Case Gf.30587/2013/4 (High Court of Appeal of Debrecen), appealed from Case G.40186/2011/34 (Debrecen Regional Court);

Case Pf.21464/2015/6 (High Court of Appeal of Budapest), appealed from Case P.24929/2014/19 (Budapest-Capital Regional Court);

Case Pf.20222/2013/6 (High Court of Appeal of Budapest), appealed from Case P.22877/2012/10 (Budapest-Capital Regional Court);

Case Gf.20046/2014/26 (High Court of Appeal of Győr), appealed from Case G.40071/2012/31 (Szombathely Regional Court);

Case Gf.30160/2014/21 (High Court of Appeal of Debrecen), appealed from Case G.40043/2012/56 (Miskolc Regional Court);

Case Gf.40277/2015/6 (High Court of Appeal of Budapest), appealed from Case G.40433/2010/129 (Budapest-Capital Regional Court);

Case G.40029/2013/49 (Debrecen Regional Court);

Case Pf.21147/2012/5 (High Court of Appeal of Budapest), appealed from Case P.22570/2010/57 (Budapest-Capital Regional Court);

Case Pf.21072/2015/4 (High Court of Appeal of Szeged), appealed from Case P.20696/2015/10 (Szeged Regional Court);

Case 10.Gf.40.560/2011/6 (High Court of Appeal of Budapest), appealed from Case G.41398/2011/6 (Budapest-Capital Regional Court);

Case Pf.20095/2015/5 (High Court of Appeal of Budapest), appealed from Case P.20298/2013/22 (Budapest-Capital Regional Court);

Case Gfv.30336/2014/1 (Supreme Court), appealed from Case Pf.20390/2014/5 (High Court of Appeal of Budapest), appealed from Case G.41053/2008/89 (Budapest-Capital Regional Court);

Case Pf.21712/2010/5 (High Court of Appeal of Budapest), appealed from Case P.23933/2009/18 (Budapest-Capital Regional Court);

Case Gf.40305/2016/16 (High Court of Appeal of Budapest), appealed from Case G.41795/2014/106 (Budapest-Capital Regional Court);

Case Pfv.20661/2013/5 (Supreme Court), appealed from Case Pf.22006/2012/6 (High Court of Appeal of Budapest), appealed from Case G.40913/2012/13 (Budapest-Capital Regional Court);

Case Pfv.20852/2014/6 (Supreme Court), appealed from Case Pf.640701/2013/4 (Budapest-Capital Regional Court), appealed from Case P.87875/2012/31 (Pest Central District Court);

Case Pf.20218/2013/8 (High Court of Appeal of Debrecen), appealed from P.21966/2011/49 (Miskolc Regional Court);

Case Pf.20267/2013/3 (High Court of Appeal of Győr), appealed from Case P.20336/2012/42 (Győr Regional Court);

Case Pfv.VIII.20.109/2019 (Supreme Court), reported as BH 2020.8.242, appealed from Case Pf.633945/2018/6 (Budapest-Capital Regional Court), appealed from Case P.89585/2015/55 (Central District Court of Pest);

Case Pfv.20187/2016/6 (Supreme Court), appealed from Case Gf.40013/2015/15 (High Court of Appeal of Pécs), appealed from Case G.40110/2013/45 (Zalaegerszeg Regional Court);

Case Pfv.22126/2016/4 (Supreme Court), appealed from Case Pf.20168/2016/3 (Kaposvár Regional Court), appealed from Case P.20051/2014/59 (Marcali Local Court);

Case Kfv.37612/2011/3 (Supreme Court), appealed from Case K.30410/2011/2 (Budapest-Capital Regional Court);

Case Mpk.10.115/2013 (Supreme Court), reported as EBH.2013.M.11 (The Brussels I Regulation was not applicable ratione temporis);

Case Pf.20492/2019/6 (High Court of Appeal of Budapest), appealed from Case P.21214/2016/16 (Budapest Regional Court);

Case Gf.40180/2013/6 (High Court of Appeal of Budapest), appealed from Case G.40386/2011/40 (Budapest-Capital Regional Court);

Case G.20017/2010/17 (Balassagyarmat Regional Court);

Case Pf.20691/2017/10 (High Court of Appeal of Budapest), appealed from Case P.25618/2014/45 (Budapest-Capital Regional Court);

Case Gf.20108/2020/5 (High Court of Appeal of Győr);

Case Pf.20193/2020/5 (High Court of Appeal of Debrecen), appealed from Case P.20916/2019/24 (Miskolc Regional Court);

Case Pf.632162/2019/4 (Budapest-Capital Regional Court), appealed from Case P.24479/2015/96 (Budapest District Court for the II and III Districts);

Case Pkf.3.25.417/2010/1 (High Court of Appeal of Budapest), appealed from Case 9.Pkf.29.098/2009/2 (Budapest Regional Court);

Case 3.Gf.30.904/2010/2 (High Court of Appeal of Debrecen), appealed from Case 8.G.20.557/2010/4 (Debrecen Regional Court);

Case Pfv.I.20.844/2012/8 (Supreme Court), appealed from Case 8.Pkf.24.148/2011/2 (Budapest Regional Court);

Case Gf.IV.30.177/2012/12 (High Court of Appeal of Pécs), appealed from Case 1.G.40.147/2009/49 (Kaposvár Regional Court);

Case 16.Gf.40.345/2015/16 (High Court of Appeal of Budapest), appealed from Case 8.G.43.817/2013/49 (Budapest-Capital Regional Court);

Case Gpkf.11.44.072/2016/3 (High Court of Appeal of Budapest), appealed from Case 5.G.42.087/2015/24 (Budapest-Capital Regional Court);

Case 10.Kpkf.670.096/2018/3 (Budapest-Capital Regional Court), appealed from Case 36.Kpk.46.003/2017/5 (Budapest-Capital Administrative and Labor Court);

Case 14.Gf.40.050/2006/2 (Supreme Court), appealed from Case 32.G.40.607/2005/6-II (Budapest-Capital Regional Court);

Case 16.Gf.40.338/2006/6 (High Court of Appeal of Budapest), appealed from Case 35.G.41.174/2005/17 (Budapest-Capital Regional Court);

Case 14.Gpkf.43.918/2007/4 (High Court of Appeal of Budapest), appealed from Case G.20.517/2007/4 (Budapest Regional Court);

Case 10.Gf.40.507/2007/2 (High Court of Appeal of Budapest), appealed from Case 9.G.41.753/2006/16 (Budapest-Capital Regional Court);

Case 14.Cgf.43.068/2009/8 (High Court of Appeal of Budapest), appealed from Case Cg.01-09-878467/6 (Budapest-Capital Regional Court);

Case 11.Fpkf. 43.076/2009/10 (High Court of Appeal of Budapest);

Case Pfv.II.20.491/2009/5 (Supreme Court), appealed from Case 2.Pf.20.552/2008/13 (Veszprém Regional Court), appealed from Case 4.P.21.495/2006 (Veszprém Local Court);

Case 5.Pf.21.249/2009/2 (High Court of Appeal of Budapest), appealed from Case 4.P.24.497/2008/2 (Budapest-Capital Regional Court);

Case 4.Kpkf.50.658/2009/2 (High Court of Appeal of Budapest), appealed from Case 3.K.20.918/2008/9 (Szeged Regional Court);

Case 4.Kpkf.50.682/2009/2 (High Court of Appeal of Budapest), appealed from Case 3.K.20.850/2008/10 (Szeged Regional Court);

Case 4.Kpkf.50.735/2009/2 (High Court of Appeal of Budapest), appealed from Case 3.K.22.175/2007/5 (Szeged Regional Court);

Case Pfv. I. 21.721/2011/5 (Supreme Court), appealed from Case 47.Pkfv.630.753/2011 (Budapest-Capital Regional Court);

Case 10.Gf.40.227/2014/3-II. (High Court of Appeal of Budapest), appealed from Case 12.G.41.474/2008/118 (Budapest-Capital Regional Court);

Case Pfv.I.21.363/2018 (Supreme Court), reported as BH 2019.9.246;

Case Pkk.V.24.906/2018/4 (Supreme Court), reported as BH 2019.3.80;

Case 10.Cgf.47.066/2016/2 (High Court of Appeal of Budapest), reported as ÍH 2016.116;

Case Gf.40608/2017/12 (High Court of Appeal of Budapest);

Case Gf.40033/2017/4 (High Court of Appeal of Pécs), appealed from Case G.20694/2017/5 (Pécs Regional Court);

Case Cgf.II.47.032/2016/2 (High Court of Appeal of Győr), reported as ÍH 2018.35;

Case G.42206/2012/102 (Budapest-Capital Regional Court);

Case G.44696/2014/19 (Budapest-Capital Regional Court);

Case 43.Pf.632341/2019/4 (Budapest-Capital Regional Court), appealed from Case P.21637/2016/78 (Budapest District Court for the XX, XXI and XXIII Districts);

Case Gf.IV.30.173/2019/5 (High Court of Appeal of Szeged);

Case Gfv.VII.30.154/2020 (Supreme Court), reported as BH 2021.2.48;

Case Pfv.VII.21.748/2019/11 (Supreme Court), appealed from Case Gf.40313/2019/11 (High Court of Appeal of Budapest), appealed from Case G.43386/2016/87 (Budapest-Capital Regional Court);

Case Gfv.VII.30.139/2019/9 (Supreme Court), appealed from Case Gf.40502/2018/18 (High Court of Appeal of Budapest), appealed from Case G.44169/2017/22 (Budapest-Capital Regional Court);

Case Mfv.10027/2020/4 (Supreme Court);

Case Pfv.21568/2019/13 (Supreme Court), appealed from Case Pf.20014/2019/6 (High Court of Appeal of Budapest), appealed from Case P.23579/2016/51 (Budapest-Capital Regional Court);

Case Pf.20726/2019/11 (High Court of Appeal of Budapest), appealed from Case P.24633/2017/62 (Budapest-Capital Regional Court);

Case Pf.20949/2017/9 (Győr Regional Court), appealed from Case P.20677/2017/7 (Győr Local Court);

Case Gf.40206/2020/3 (High Court of Appeal of Budapest), appealed from Case G.44586/2015/186 (Budapest-Capital Regional Court);

Case Pfv.20475/2016/12 (Supreme Court), appealed from Case Pf.20413/2015/4 (High Court of Appeal of Szeged), appealed from Case P.21045/2014/19 (Kecskemét Regional Court);

Case Gfv.IX.30.186/2010 (Supreme Court), reported as EH 2010.2237;

Case Kf.37339/2019/8 (Supreme Court), appealed from Case K.700486/2018/19 (Budapest-Capital Regional Court);

Case Pfv.I.20.164/2019 (Supreme Court), reported as BH 2020.3.78;

Case Gfv.IX.30.187/2011 (Supreme Court), reported as EH 2011.2416 and BH+ 2013.1.33, appealed from Case Pf.21552/2010/3 (High Court of Appeal of Budapest), appealed from Case G.41503/2006 (Budapest-Capital Regional Court);

Case 20.Gf.40.050/2020/36-II (High Court of Appeal of Budapest), appealed from Case 7.G.20.255/2018/92 (Balassagyarmat Regional Court);

Case P.21044/2015/16 (Szeged Regional Court);

Case Gf.I.30.343/2013 (High Court of Appeal of Szeged), reported as ÍH 2014.58, appealed from Case 7.G.40.061/2013/6 (Szeged Regional Court);

Case K.27480/2015/26 (Administrative and Labor Court of Nyíregyháza);

Case Pfv.I.20.122/2015 (Supreme Court), reported as BH+ 2015.12.519;

Case Pfv.XI.21.581/2008/11 (Supreme Court), appealed from Case 42.Pkfv.632.342/2008/2 (Budapest-Capital Regional Court);

Case 16.Gf.40.303/2009/5 (High Court of Appeal of Budapest), appealed from Case 12.G.40.835/2008/12 (Budapest-Capital Regional Court);

Case 14.Gpkf.43.405/2012/2 (High Court of Appeal of Budapest), appealed from Case 25.G.42.229/2009/38 (Budapest-Capital Regional Court);

Case Gf.30410/2013/3 (High Court of Appeal of Szeged), appealed from Case G.40009/2013/15 (Gyula Regional Court);

Case Gf.VII.30.228/2013/4 (Supreme Court), Appealed from Case 14.Gf.40.512/2012/2 (High Court of Appeal of Budapest), appealed from Case 8.G.40.554/2010/34 (Budapest-Capital Regional Court), tried on remand as Case G.42072/2014/17 (Budapest-Capital Regional Court);

Case Gpkf.IV.40.160/2014/2 (High Court of Appeal of Pécs), reported as EBD 2015.12.G3, appealed from Case 4.G.40.017/2014/8 (Zalaegerszeg Regional Court);

Case Gf.40035/2014/7 (High Court of Appeal of Budapest), appealed from Case G.40456/2011/36 (Budapest Regional Court);

Case Gf.20062/2015/8 (High Court of Appeal of Győr), appealed from Case G.20918/2011/115 (Győr Regional Court);

Case Gf.20003/2015/10 (High Court of Appeal of Győr), appealed from Case G.20348/2013/83 (Győr Regional Court);

Case Pfv.20128/2016/9 (Supreme Court), appealed from Case Pf.21115/2014/6 (High Court of Appeal of Budapest), appealed from Case P.20071/2014/11 (Budapest Regional Court);

Case Pf.20539/2017/5 (High Court of Appeal of Budapest), appealed from Case P.24487/2012/47 (Budapest-Capital Regional Court);

Case Pfv.21258/2018/3 (Supreme Court);

Case Gfv.30382/2018/8 (Supreme Court), appealed from Case Gf.30270/2017/10 (High Court of Appeal of Szeged), appealed from Case G.21439/2014/63 (Szolnok Regional Court);

Case Kf.37137/2019/6 (Supreme Court), appealed from Case K.700587/2018/9 (Budapest-Capital Regional Court);

Case 9.Pkf.25.572/2020/2 (High Court of Appeal of Budapest), reported as ÍH 2020.116;

Case 10.Gpkf.44.048/2020/2 (High Court of Appeal of Budapest), reported as ÍH 2021.19.

Footnotes

^[1] This publication was funded by the European Union’s Justice Programme (2014-2020) (800789 – CEPIL – JUST-AG-2017/JUST-JCOO-AG-2017). The content of this publication represents the views of the author only and is his/her sole responsibility. The European Commission does not accept any responsibility for use that may be made of the information it contains.

^[2] In this article, Brussels I Regulation refers both to the 2001 Brussels I Regulation (Regulation 44/2001 on jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters. J.O. L 12, 16.1.2001, p. 1-23) and the 2012 Brussels II Regulation (Regulation 1215/2012 on jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters. J.O. L 351, 20.12.2012, p. 1-32) jointly and, if not specified otherwise, article numbers refer to the 2012 Brussels I Regulation.

^[3] See e.g. C-527/10 ERSTE Bank Hungary Nyrt v. Magyar Állam and Others, EU:C:2012:417; C-519/12 OTP Bank Nyilvánosan Működő Részvénytársaság v. Hochtief Solutions AG, EU:C:2013:674; C-210/06 CARTESIO Oktató és Szolgáltató bt., EU:C:2008:723; C-378/10 VALE Építési kft., EU:C:2012:440; C-94/14 Flight Refund Ltd v. Deutsche Lufthansa AG, EU:C:2016:148; C-102/15 Gazdasági Versenyhivatal v. Siemens Aktiengesellschaft Österreich, EU:C:2016:607.

^[4] See Csongor István Nagy, Nemzetközi magánjog (HVG-Orac, 2017).

^[5] Appealed from Case P.21966/2011/49 (Miskolc Regional Court).

^[6] Hungary does not take part in the enhanced cooperation concerning the Matrimonial Property Regulation (Regulation 2016/1103 implementing enhanced cooperation in the area of jurisdiction, applicable law and the recognition and enforcement of decisions in matters of matrimonial property regimes. OJ L 183, 8.7.2016, p. 1-29) and the Regulation on the Property Consequences of Registered Partnerships (Regulation 2016/1104 implementing enhanced cooperation in the area of jurisdiction, applicable law and the recognition and enforcement of decisions in matters of the property consequences of registered partnerships. OJ L 183, 8.7.2016, p. 30-56).

^[7] Section 113 of Act XXVIII of 2017 on Private International Law.

^[8] In Hungarian: “2017. évi XXVIII. törvény a nemzetközi magánjogról.”

^[9] See the compilation of the Department of Private International Law of the Ministry of Justice of Hungary, available at https://igazsagugyiinformaciok.kormany.hu/download/b/ac/c2000/%C3%A1llamok%20%C3%A9s%20egyezm%C3%A9nyek%20t%C3%A1j%C3%A9koztat%C3%B3%202021_07_22.pdf.

^[10] Section 20 of Act CXXX of 2016 on Civil Procedure.

^[11] Reported as EH 2010.2237.

^[12] Appealed from Case K.700587/2018/9 (Budapest-Capital Regional Court).

^[13] Act LVII of 1996 on the prohibition of unfair market conduct and restriction of competition (Hungarian: “1996. évi LVII. törvény a tisztességtelen piaci magatartás és versenykorlátozás tilalmáról szóló”).

^[14] § 32.

^[15] Appealed from Case K.700486/2018/19 (Budapest-Capital Regional Court).

^[16] Reported as EBD 2015.12.G3, appealed from Case 4.G.40.017/2014/8 (Zalaegerszeg Regional Court).

^[17] Appealed from Case G.40456/2011/36 (Budapest Regional Court).

^[18] Reported as BH 2020.3.78.

^[19] Reported as EH 2011.2416 and BH+ 2013.1.33, appealed from Case Pf.21552/2010/3 (High Court of Appeal of Budapest), appealed from Case G.41503/2006 (Budapest-Capital Regional Court).

^[20] Appealed from Case 12.G.40.835/2008/12 (Budapest-Capital Regional Court).

^[21] Section 292(3) of Act CXLIV of 1997 on economic companies (in Hungarian 1997. évi CXLIV. törvény – a gazdasági társaságokról).

^[22] Appealed from Case G.20348/2013/83 (High Court of Appeal of Győr).

^[23] “The Treaties shall apply to the Channel Islands and the Isle of Man only to the extent necessary to ensure the implementation of the arrangements for those islands set out in the Treaty concerning the accession of new Member States to the European Economic Community and to the European Atomic Energy Community signed on 22 January 1972”.

^[24] Appealed from Case 7.G.20.255/2018/92 (Balassagyarmat Regional Court).

^[25] § 55-57. See C-27/17 AB ‘flyLAL-Lithunian Airlines’ v. Starptautiskā lidosta ‘Rīga’ VAS and ‘Air Baltic Corporation’ AS, EU:C:2018:533; C-352/13 Cartel Damage Claims (CDC) Hydrogen Peroxide SA v. Evonik Degussa GmbH and Others, EU:C:2015:335; C-451/18 Tibor-Trans Fuvarozó és Kereskedelmi Kft. v. DAF TRUCKS N.V., EU:C:2019:635.

^[26] § 58-59.

^[27] Appealed from Case P.24487/2012/47 (Budapest-Capital Regional Court).

^[28] Appealed from Case G.40009/2013/15 (Gyula Regional Court).

^[29] Appealed from Case G.20918/2011/115 (Győr Regional Court).

^[30] Reported as ÍH 2014.58, appealed from Case 7.G.40.061/2013/6 (Szeged Regional Court).

^[31] Reported as ÍH 2020.116.

^[32] Appealed from Case 14.Gf.40.512/2012/2 (High Court of Appeal of Budapest), appealed from Case 8.G.40.554/2010/34 (Budapest-Capital Regional Court), tried on remand as Case G.42072/2014/17 (Budapest-Capital Regional Court).

^[33] Law-Decree 13 of 1979 on Private International Law (in Hungarian: “1979. évi 13. törvényerejű rendelet a nemzetközi magánjogról”). This was replaced by Act XXVIII of 2017 on Private International Law (in Hungarian: “2017. évi XXVIII. törvény a nemzetközi magánjogról”).

^[34] Appealed from Case Gf.30270/2017/10 (High Court of Appeal of Szeged), appealed from Case G.21439/2014/63 (Szolnok Regional Court).

^[35] § 39.

^[36] § 41.

^[37] § 42.

^[38] ÍH 2021.19.

^[39] Appealed from Case 25.G.42.229/2009/38 (Budapest-Capital Regional Court).

^[40] Case 42.Pkfv.632.342/2008/2 (Budapest-Capital Regional Court).

^[41] Reported as BH+ 2015.12.519.

^[42] Appealed from Case Pf.21115/2014/6 (High Court of Appeal of Budapest), appealed from Case P.20071/2014/11 (Budapest Regional Court).

^[43] Convention on jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters, (2007) J.O. L 339/3.